Kleptocrats and money laundering: mechanisms of financial concealment and reputation management

Financial Concealment and the Construction of a Positive Public Image

The triad of corruption, money laundering, and cyber enablers is so deeply intertwined with the legal economy that money laundering appears accessible to all. The primary challenge lies not in concealing illicit financial flows but in cultivating a positive public image necessary to enjoy the proceeds of laundering.

For high-profile criminals, survival often depends on anchoring themselves in lawless zones—failed states or kleptocratic regimes. These refuges offer volatile protection, as evidenced by the trajectories of figures such as Jack Ma, Yevgeny Prigozhin, or the death sentence (fortunately commutable upon repayment) imposed on Truong My Lan in Vietnam . Prudence, as advised by the Financial Action Task Force (Financial Action Task Force FATF-GAFI, 2018), dictates the development of a contingency plan, preferably within a rule-of-law state that ensures enduring access to laundered funds.

Once established as kleptocrats, these individuals face the challenge of accessing their ill-gotten gains outside their sanctuaries. The article The Rise of Kleptocracy: Laundering Cash, Whitewashing Reputations (Cooley et al., 2018) examines the methods employed to achieve this.

If the objective were merely to obscure the criminal origins of funds, frontmen and investments routed through non-cooperative states would suffice. However, to fully benefit from their crimes, kleptocrats must themselves be “laundered.” This requires the involvement of professional money launderers operating in networks. Beyond bankers, lawyers, and real estate agents, these intermediaries shape the public image of kleptocrats, erasing traces of criminal activity and presenting them as legitimate and virtuous economic actors.

In this criminal ecosystem, laws against corruption, money laundering, and breaches of integrity lose their efficacy. Rather than existing above the law, these networks exploit legal frameworks – both as opportunities for crime and as protective shields – creating what appears to be a lawless world “Un monde sans loi” (Maillard & Grézaud, 1998) for these professionals and their clients. Cooley et al. describe this phenomenon as an “uncivil transnational society”.

Global Institutions Repurposed for Criminal Interests

  • Acquisition of Foreign Citizenship and Residency: Rule-of-law states provide legal protection, personal security, and an “exit route” in times of domestic turmoil.
  • Golden Passports: Programmes in Malta, Cyprus, and the Caribbean allow the purchase of citizenship, sometimes granting access to the European Union.
  • Diplomatic Appointments: Close associates are appointed to diplomatic roles, securing immunity and foreign residency rights.

Media Campaigns to Portray Kleptocrats as Reformers

  • Professional Lobbyists: Facilitate connections with political decision-makers.
  • Think Tanks, Media, and PR Firms: Suppress or downplay negative information, launch defamation campaigns against opponents, and divert attention from abuses.
  • Political and Strategic Donations: Funding for political parties, states, or strategic projects to cultivate influence.

Instrumental Philanthropy to Cultivate a Benevolent Image

  • Partnerships with Respected Institutions: Enhance credibility.
  • Support for High-Profile Events: Cultural, charitable, or prestigious initiatives.
  • Donations to Academic Institutions and Think Tanks: Purchase respectability and shape debates on sensitive issues.

Solutions to Combat Money Laundering

Cooley et al. focus on strengthening legal and regulatory obligations: disclosure of ultimate beneficial owners, financial transparency, oversight of banks and institutions, and enhanced information sharing. While these measures can help trace laundering chains and corrupt agreements, they lack anticipatory or preventive functions. Despite continuous reinforcement since the 1996 Geneva Call (Bertossa et al., 1996; Maillard, 2021) their impact on corruption, money laundering, and integrity violations remains unmeasurable.

Kleptocrats only become visible – and subject to international sanctions or prosecutionwhen their reputation is damaged or when they are abandoned by their kleptocratic regimes.

In 2025, merging solutions, offer promising alternatives to traditional methods, which rely on ex post declarations and struggle to address increasingly complex criminal schemes.

The ENSEMBLE project proposes using artificial intelligence to analyse financial transactions in real time, identifying anomalous behaviour (suspicious flows, opaque legal structures, and correlations between bank accounts and cryptocurrencies). While not yet predictive, this approach enables early risk detection, reducing the time between offence and interception. It also improves the identification of habitual offenders and repeat crimes.

Cryptocurrencies, due to their pseudo-anonymity, are poised to play a growing role in money laundering. ENSEMBLE is developing advanced tracing methods for digital asset transactions, combining blockchain analysis, identification of illicit wallets, and mapping of cross-border flows. These techniques aim to trace the origin and destination of funds using clustering heuristics and collaborative databases like MISP. The goal is to anticipate the rise of crypto-assets and dismantle laundering networks by identifying intermediaries (exchanges, money mules) and automating the detection of fraudulent schemes, all while adhering to legal constraints (GDPR, banking secrecy).

Written by Paul Labic. Laboratory for theoretical and applied economics (BETA), CNRS UMR 7522. Associate researcher at the research lab of the French police academy (ENSP)


REFERENCES

Bertossa, B., Liberati, E. B., Colombo, G., Dejemeppe, B., Real, B. G., Villarejo, C. J., & Ruymbeke, R. Van. (1996, October 1). L’appel de Genève. 1.

Cooley, A., Heathershaw, J., & Sharman, J. C. (2018). The Rise of Kleptocracy : Laundering Cash , Whitewashing Reputations. Journal of Democracy, 29(1), 39–53. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-rise-of-kleptocracy-laundering-cash-whitewashing-reputations/

Financial Action Task Force FATF-GAFI. (2018). Professional money laundering through trade and money services businesses (Issue July). https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/Professional-money-laundering.html

Maillard, J. De. (2021, June 26). Vingt-cinq ans après l’appel de Genève, bilan contrasté, menace avérée. Colloque 25 Ans Après l’appel de Genève, 7.

Maillard, J. De, & Grézaud, P.-X. (1998). Un monde sans loi. Stock.

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